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Abstract
This paper extends Woodford’s (2010) approach to the robustly optimal monetary policy to
a general linear quadratic framework. We provide algorithms to solve for a time-invariant lin-
ear robustly optimal policy in a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov
perfect equilibrium under discretion. We apply our methods to a New Keynesian model of
monetary policy with persistent cost-push shocks and inflation persistence. We find that
the robustly optimal commitment inflation is less responsive to a cost-push shock when
the shock is more persistent, and that the robustly optimal discretionary policy is more
responsive to lagged inflation when inflation is more persistent.
JEL Classification: D81, D84, E52
Keywords: commitment, discretion, robustness, policy analysis
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1. Introduction
The traditional policy analysis has been typically conducted under the rational expectations
hypothesis. While we have learned many lessons from this hypothesis, there are several good
reasons for us to think about departures from it. First, the Ellsberg (1961) paradox and related
experimental evidence demonstrate that there is a distinction between risk and ambiguity.
Risk refers to the situation where there is a known probability distribution over the state of
the world, while ambiguity refers to the situation where the information is too vague to be
adequately summarized by a single probability distribution. As a result, a decision maker may
have multiple priors in mind (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Second, as Anderson, Hansen,
and Sargent (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) point out, economic agents view
economic models as an approximation to the true model. They believe that economic data
come from an unknown member of a set of unspecified models near the approximating model.
Concern about model misspecification induces a decision maker to want robust decision rules
that work over that set of nearby models.1
The arguments above are especially relevant for policy analysis in which uncertainty and
expectations play an important role. Either the policymaker or the private agents may not have
complete confidence in the likelihood of the state of the world and hence face model ambiguity.
Several possibilities may arise.2 First, the policymaker does not trust its approximating model,
but the private agents do. The policymaker forms expectations using a model in a set of nearby
models surrounding its approximating model. Hansen and Sargent (2003 and 2008, Chapter
16) study this case. Woodford (2010) studies a second case in which the policymaker trusts
its approximating model, but it has ambiguity about the private agents’ beliefs about the
model. The policymaker thinks that the private agents may form expectations using any model
in a set of nearby models surrounding the policymaker’s approximating model. This type of
concern for robustness is motivated by the recognition that the private agents can form their
beliefs based on an alternative model which is not easily distinguishable from the policymaker’s
model. In this sense the policymaker is fairly agnostic about private agents’ expectations,
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while assuming they are not too excessively inconsistent with her model. The Hansen-Sargent
approach seems well understood and several computation algorithms in the linear-quadratic
framework have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2008), Giordani
and So¨derlind (2008), Dennis (2008), Dennis, Leitemo, and So¨derstro¨m (2009), Leitemo and
So¨derstro¨m (2009)). However, little is known about how to conduct robust policy analysis using
the Woodford approach in a general linear-quadratic framework.
This paper fills this gap by proposing algorithms for solving robustly optimal policy. Our
algorithms borrow insights from Woodford (2010), who derives analytical solutions for a simple
basic New Keynesian model. We focus on conditionally linear policy rules under timeless
perspective commitment and linear Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) under discretion. We
show that robustly optimal conditionally linear policy and a linear Markov perfect equilibrium
can exist given certain conditions. Our algorithms then reduce to solving for linear decision
rules using tools from the literature on solving linear rational expectations models and linear-
quadratic control problems.
We apply our algorithms to a New Keynesian model with a persistent cost-push shock and
inflation persistence. The Woodford (2010) model is a special case of our model. We confirm
Woodford’s (2010) major findings for the case of purely temporary shocks that (i) the robustly
optimal inflation is less responsive to the current cost-push shock, and (ii) the robustly optimal
inflation is more history-dependent compared to the case of rational expectations. We also find
some new comparative statics results: (i) When the cost-push shock becomes more persistent,
robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to it, but the robustly optimal output gap is more
responsive. By contrast, optimal inflation under rational expectations is more responsive to
a cost-push shock when it is more persistent. (ii) In addition, the robust discretionary policy
becomes more costly and the range of parameters for the existence of a linear MPE shrinks.
(iii) When the steady state is more inefficient, the robustly optimal inflation is less responsive
to the cost-push shock.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase
in response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness. The
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central bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the inflation expectation of private
agents unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off might worsen if
it allows inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank’s concern for the unfavorable change
in the private agents’ forecast becomes larger when the cost-push shock is more persistent. As
a result, the central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal inflation rate. If the shock
is as highly persistent as a unit root process, the central bank commits to an inflation rate
which does not depend on the current shock.
In our model, the New Keynesian Phillips curve contains lagged inflation. The lagged
inflation rate is an endogenous state variable and hence the method in Woodford (2010) cannot
be applied. Using our algorithms, we find the following new results: (i) When the degree
of inflation inertia is larger, the sensitivities to the contemporaneous cost-push shock of both
the robustly optimal commitment and discretionary policies are closer to those under rational
expectations. In this case, the impact of the belief distortion from the private sector is smaller
as a smaller weight is attached to the expected inflation. (ii) The robustly optimal discretionary
policy is more sensitive to lagged inflation than the optimal discretionary policy under rational
expectations. This sensitivity increases as the volatility of the cost-push shock increases. This is
in contrast to the case of rational expectations under which the optimal discretionary inflation
responds to lagged inflation by the same degree regardless of the size of the shock volatility. The
intuition is that, without commitment, the inflation bias is larger with concerns for robustness
than in the case of rational expectations. Under the worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations
are biased upward, and hence a discretionary central bank has a greater incentive to respond
to both the current shock and lagged inflation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework.
Section 3 presents an algorithm for solving robustly optimal policy in a timeless perspective.
Section 4 provides an algorithm for solving robustly optimal discretionary policy. Section 5
analyzes a monetary policy example. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are relegated to
appendices.
6
2. A Linear-Quadratic Framework
2.1. Uncertainty and Beliefs
Uncertainty is generated by a stochastic process of shocks {εt}
∞
t=0 where εt is an nε × 1
vector of independently and identically distributed standard normal random variable. Let
εt = {ε0, ε1, ..., εt} . At date t, both the policymaker and the private sector have common infor-
mation generated by εt and some initial state x0. They may not have rational expectations in
that their subjective beliefs may not coincide with the objective probability distribution gov-
erning exogenous shocks {εt}
∞
t=0. One reason is that economic agents view their model as an
approximation and thus may be concerned about model misspecification.
Model misspecification is described by a perturbation to the distribution of shocks. Let
p (ε) denote the standard normal density of εt. Let P and Pt denote the induced distribution
over the full state space and the induced joint distribution of εt, respectively. Assume that a
distorted distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference distribution P. We
can then represent belief distortions by Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
Let pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
denote an alternative one-step-ahead density for εt+1 conditioned on date
t information. Form the likelihood ratio or the Radon-Nikodym derivative for one-step-ahead
distributions:
mt+1 =
pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
p (ε)
.
It satisfies the property
Et [mt+1] = 1, (1)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator for the reference distribution P given
date t information. Conditional expectations based on the distorted distribution pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
can
7
be expressed as
Eˆtyt+1 = Et [mt+1yt+1] (2)
for any random variable yt+1.
Inspired by Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), Woodford (2010) uses conditional relative
entropy to measure the discrepancy between the distorted distribution and the reference dis-
tribution. He first constructs the conditional relative entropy of a one-step-ahead distribution
given date t information as Et [mt+1 lnmt+1]. He then defines the expected discounted entropy
conditioned on date zero information as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [Et (mt+1 lnmt+1)] = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1. (3)
Model ambiguity is described by a set of one-step-ahead densities {mt}
∞
t=1 satisfying the con-
straint:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1 ≤ η0 (4)
for some η0 > 0.
2.2. Robustly Optimal Policy Problem
Suppose that the equilibrium system from the private sector can be summarized by the following
form: I 0
D21 D22

 xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
 = Aˆ
 xt
yt
+ Bˆut +
 Ĉx
0
 εt+1, (5)
where x0 is exogenously given and Eˆt denotes the conditional expectation operator given date
t information based on the distorted beliefs of the private sector defined in (2). The private
sector’s beliefs may not coincide with the “objective” probability distribution for {εt} , the
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reference distribution P. Here xt is an nx × 1 vector of predetermined variables in the sense
defined in Klein (2000), yt is an ny×1 vector of non-predetermined or forward-looking variables,
and ut is an nu × 1 vector of instrument or control variables chosen by the policymaker. We
typically use xt to represent the state of the economy, which may include productivity shocks,
preference shocks, or capital stock. Note that xt may include a component of unity in order to
handle constants. The vector yt represents endogenous variables such as consumption, inflation
rate, and output. Examples of instruments ut include interest rates and money growth rates.
The equation for xt is backward-looking and represents the law of motion of state variables.
The equation for yt is forward-looking and typically represents the first-order conditions from
intertemporal optimization, such as Euler equations.
All matrices in (5) are conformable. For simplicity, we suppose that the matrix on the left
side of equation (5) is invertible so that we can multiply both sides of this equation by its
inverse to obtain the system:3
 xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
 = A
 xt
yt
+But +Cεt+1, (6)
where we have used the shorthand notation,
A ≡
 Axx Axy
Ayx Ayy
 , B ≡
 Bx
By
 , C ≡
 Cx
0
 ,
and where we have partitioned matrices conformably.
The policymaker has the period loss function,
L (xt, yt, ut) =
1
2
[
x′t, y
′
t
]  Qxx, Qxy
Q′xy Qyy

 xt
yt
+ 1
2
u′tRut +
[
x′t, y
′
t
]  Sx
Sy
ut,
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where we assume the matrix
Qxx Qxy Sx
Q′xy Qyy Sy
S′x S
′
y R
 ,
is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
If both the private sector and the policymaker have rational expectations, then they have
common beliefs which coincide with P, the probability distribution governing exogenous shocks
{εt} . In this case, the optimal policy problem with commitment is given by
max
{xt,yt,ut}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) , (7)
subject to (6) in which the conditional expectation operator Eˆt is equal to Et, the conditional
expectation operator with respect to P.
Following Woodford (2010), we suppose that the policymaker has a single model of the
exogenous processes {εt} and thus no ambiguity along this dimension. Nevertheless, the poli-
cymaker faces ambiguity because it knows only that the private sector’s model is within a set of
probability models surrounding its own model. The policymaker evaluates the private sector’s
forward-looking equation using a worst-case model and solves the following problem:
max
{xt,yt,ut}
min
{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) + θE0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1, (8)
subject to (1) and
 xt+1
Et [mt+1yt+1]
 = A
 xt
yt
+But + Cεt+1. (9)
Here the parameter θ > 0 penalizes one-step-ahead densities {mt} with large relative entropies
defined in (3). It may be regarded as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (4). Following
10
Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), instead of solving for the constraint problem subject to
(4), we treat θ as a parameter, which measures the policymaker’s degree of concern for possible
departures from rational expectations, with a small value of θ implying a great degree of concern
for robustness, while a large value of θ implies that only modest departures from rational
expectations are considered plausible. When θ → ∞, the rational expectations analysis is
obtained as a limiting case.
3. Commitment in a Timeless Perspective
Instead of solving for an optimal commitment policy,4 Woodford (2010) uses a timeless perspec-
tive to derive a closed-form solution to a robustly optimal monetary policy problem in a simple
New Keynesian model. We now extend his idea to our general formulation. We replace E0 in
(8) with E−1, the conditional expectation operator given the economy’s state at date −1, i.e.,
before the realization of the period zero state x0 or implied ε0. Instead of supposing that the
policymaker chooses a sequence of (possibly time-varying) {yt} for all t ≥ 0, we consider only
the problem of choosing an optimal sequence of commitments {yt} for periods t ≥ 1, taking as
given a commitment y0 that the policymaker must fulfill.
Suppose that the initial commitment takes a linear form:
y0 = Φ−1 + Γ−1ε0,
for some coefficients (Φ−1,Γ−1) . Suppose that {yt} chosen for periods t ≥ 1 may depend on
(Φ−1,Γ−1) and shocks from periods zero through t. We focus on conditionally linear rules of
the following form:
yt+1 = Φt + Γtεt+1, t ≥ 0, (10)
where Φt is stochastic and measurable with respect to date t information and Γt is deterministic.
For any initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) , the policymaker chooses (Φt,Γt)t≥0 , {xt, yt,mt}t≥1 ,
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and {ut}t≥0 to solve problem (8).
To define optimal policy from a timeless perspective, suppose that Φ−1 is drawn from some
distribution ρ. The initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) is self-consistent if the solution to the robust
policy is such that (i) Γt = Γ−1 and (ii) the unconditional distribution of Φt is equal to ρ, for
each t ≥ 0. Our goal is to solve for a conditionally linear robustly optimal policy with a
self-consistent initial commitment.5
Form the Lagrangian expression:
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
− L (xt, yt, ut) + θmt+1 lnmt+1 − φt (Etmt+1 − 1)
−
[
µ′xt+1, µ
′
yt
]
 xt+1
Etmt+1yt+1
−A
 xt
yt
−But − Cεt+1
},
where βtφt and β
t
[
µ′xt+1, µ
′
yt
]
are vectors of Lagrange multipliers associated with the con-
straints (1) and (9), respectively. Note that µxt+1 is measurable with respect to date t + 1
information and corresponds to xt+1, but µyt is measurable with respect to date t information
and corresponds to yt.
The first-order conditions with respect to mt+1 are given by
θ(1 + lnmt+1)− φt − µ
′
ytyt+1 = 0. (11)
Substituting the linear form in (10) into the above equation yields:
lnmt+1 = −1 + θ
−1φt + θ
−1µ′yt(Φt + Γtεt+1). (12)
Since Γt, Φt, µyt, φt are measurable with respect to the date t information, mt+1 follows a
log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information. Using equation (1), we can show
that the worst-case density is given by
mt+1 = exp
(
−
1
2
θ−2µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt + θ
−1µ′ytΓtεt+1
)
. (13)
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This implies that under the worst-case belief, the shock εt follows a normal distribution with
mean θ−1Γ
′
tµyt and covariance matrix I.
Under the worst-case belief, the conditional expectation of yt+1 is given by
Etmt+1yt+1 = Φt + θ
−1ΓtΓ
′
tµyt, (14)
and the conditional relative entropy is given by
Etmt+1 lnmt+1 =
1
2
θ−2µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt. (15)
Since Etyt+1 = Φt, it follows that, relative to the policymaker’s expectations, the worst-case
beliefs distort the private agents’ expectations by θ−1ΓtΓ
′
tµyt.
Now substitute equations (14) and (15) into the Lagrangian to obtain
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−L(xt,Φt−1 + Γt−1εt, ut) +
1
2
θ−1µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt
−
[
µ′xt+1, µ
′
yt
]
 xt+1
Φt + θ
−1ΓtΓ
′
tµyt
−A
 xt
Φt−1 + Γt−1εt
 −But −Cεt+1
)}
The first-order conditions with respect to xt, ut, Φt, and Γt are given by
6
xt : 0 = −Qxxxt −Qxy (Φt−1 + Γt−1εt)− Sxut − β
−1µxt +A
′
xxEtµxt+1 +A
′
yxµyt, (16)
ut : 0 = −Rut − S
′
xxt − S
′
y (Φt−1 + Γt−1εt) +B
′
xEtµxt+1 +B
′
yµyt, (17)
Φt : 0 = −
(
Q′xyEtxt+1 +QyyΦt
)
− SyEtut+1 − β
−1µyt +Et
[
A′xyµxt+2 +A
′
yyµyt+1
]
, (18)
Γt : 0 =− βQ
′
xyEtxt+1ε
′
t+1 − βQyyEt (Φt + Γtεt+1) ε
′
t+1 − βSyEtut+1ε
′
t+1
− θ−1µytµ
′
ytΓt + βEt
[(
A′xyµxt+2 +A
′
yyµyt+1
)
ε′t+1
]
. (19)
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Plugging (10), (14) and (15) into (9) yields:
0 = xt+1 −Axxxt −Axy (Φt−1 + Γt−1εt)−Bxut − Cxεt+1, (20)
θ−1ΓtΓ
′
tµyt +Φt −Ayxxt −Ayy (Φt−1 + Γt−1εt)−Byut = 0. (21)
Since we focus on self-consistent optimal policy, we assume that Γt = Γ for all t. We start
with an initial guess of Γ and then solve for
{
xt, ut,Φt, µxt, µyt
}
given this guess. Equations
(16), (17), (18), (20), and (21), together with two identity equations, Etεt+1 = 0 and Etµxt+1 ≡
Etµxt+1, form a linear system of the following form:
J

Etεt+1
Etxt+1
Φt
Etut+1
Etµyt+1
Etµxt+1
Etµxt+2

= F

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

, (22)
where
J =

I 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I 0
0 I 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 A′xx 0
0 0 0 0 0 B′x 0
0 Q′xy Qyy Sy −A
′
yy 0 −A
′
xy

,
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and
F =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 I
AxyΓ Axx Axy Bx 0 0 0
AyyΓ Ayx Ayy By −θ
−1ΓΓ′ 0 0
QxyΓ Qxx Qxy Sx −A
′
yx β
−1I 0
S′yΓ S
′
x S
′
y R −B
′
y 0 0
0 0 0 0 −β−1I 0 0

.
Here εt, xt and Φt−1 are predetermined variables, and ut, µyt, µxt and Etµxt+1 are non-
predetermined variables.7 Adapting a standard method for solving linear rational expectations
models (e.g., Klein (2000)), we can show in Appendix A that the solution takes the following
state space representation:8

εt+1
xt+1
Φt
 =M

εt
xt
Φt−1
+

I
Cx
0
 εt+1. (23)
and

ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

= N

εt
xt
Φt−1
 , (24)
where the first row of M contains zero elements.
For Φt to have an invariant distribution, (23) should be a stationary process, which can be
satisfied if M has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Note that this condition comes from
the assumption that the number of predetermined (or backward-looking) variables must be the
same as the number of stable generalized eigenvalues for (J, F ) for a unique stable solution
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to exist (see Klein (2000)). We assume this condition is satisfied. But we have to check it
numerically since Φt is endogenous.
After deriving the state space representation, we can derive an updated value for Γ using
(19). When θ is finite, the presence of the term β−1θ−1µytµ
′
ytΓt in (19) implies that the
solution for Γ may be time varying. The timeless perspective discussed in Woodford (2010)
solves this issue. Since the optimal policy in the timeless perspective should satisfy (19) for
every realization of the initial commitment, Φ−1, we can take unconditional expectations on
both sides of (19) to derive 9
Γ = β
(
θ−1E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
+ βQyy
)−1
×
{
E
[(
A′xyµxt+2 +A
′
yyµyt+1
)
ε′t+1
]
−Q′xyCx − SyE
[
utε
′
t
]}
, (25)
where we have assumed that the inverse exists. In Appendix B, we derive formulas for computing
unconditional moments E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
, E
[
µxt+2ε
′
t+1
]
, E
[
µyt+1ε
′
t+1
]
, and E [utε
′
t]. The above
equation gives an updated solution for Γ denoted by Γˆ. If Γˆ is sufficiently close to Γ, stop.
Otherwise, use Γˆ to replace Γ and repeat the above procedure until convergence. We are
unable to give a condition to guarantee convergence. But this algorithm works well for all
examples studied in this paper.
From the above analysis, we find that the robustness parameter θ appears explicitly in two
terms only: one is −θ−1ΓΓ′ in the matrix F and the other is θ−1E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
in equation (25). In
the limit as θ →∞, both terms vanish and the solution converges to the rational expectations
case. When θ is smaller, the impact of robustness is larger. In addition, the impact of robustness
on Γ depends on the moment E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
for any fixed finite value of θ. These observations are
important for understanding the intuition behind the examples analyzed later.
4. Robust Discretionary Policy
To understand the value and importance of policy commitment, we now study robust discre-
tionary policy. In this case, the policymaker reoptimizes every period by taking the private
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agents’ expectations about future policy as given. We shall focus on Markov perfect equilib-
rium (MPE). A robust MPE consists of time-invariant functions f (xt) and V (xt) such that
given yt+1 = f (xt+1) , V (xt) and yt = f (xt) solve the following Bellman equation:
V (xt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1
− L (xt, yt, ut) + βEtV (xt+1) + θEtmt+1 lnmt+1, (26)
subject to (1) and (9).
We focus on linear solutions for f in that
yt = Gxt, for all t, (27)
for some matrix G to be determined. Adapting the method from the rational expectations
analysis (e.g., Backus and Driffil (1986) and So¨derlind (1999)), we use an iterative procedure
to find G by backward induction. Specifically, let
yt+1 = Gt+1xt+1, (28)
where Gt+1 is a deterministic matrix. Substituting this expression into the forward-looking
equation in (9) and rewrite the Bellman equation (26) as
Vt (xt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1
− L (xt, yt, ut) + βEtVt+1 (xt+1) + θEtmt+1 lnmt+1. (29)
We can show that the first-order condition with respect to mt+1 is given by (11), where φt
and µyt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (1) and the forward-looking equation in
(9), respectively. Using equations (1), (9), (11), (27) we can show that
mt+1 = exp
(
−
1
2
θ−2µ′ytGt+1CxC
′
xG
′
t+1µyt + θ
−1µ′ytGt+1Cxεt+1
)
.
It follows that mt+1 follows a log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information. We
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can then compute
Etmt+1 lnmt+1 =
1
2
θ−1µ′ytΛt+1µyt, (30)
Etmt+1yt+1 = Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) + Λt+1µyt, (31)
where we define Λt+1 ≡ θ
−1Gt+1CxC
′
xG
′
t+1. Since Etyt+1 = Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) , the
worst-case beliefs distort the private agents’ expectations by Λt+1µyt, relative to the policy-
maker’s expectations.
Substituting (31) into (9) yields:
Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) + Λt+1µyt = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut. (32)
Conjecture that
Vt (xt) = −
1
2
x′tJtxt −
1
2
vt,
where Jt is a deterministic matrix and vt is a deterministic constant. Substituting the conjecture
and (30) into the Bellman equation (29) yields:
−
1
2
x′tJtxt −
1
2
vt = max
yt,ut
−
1
2
x′tQxxxt −
1
2
y′tQyyyt − x
′
tQxyyt (33)
−
1
2
u′tRut − x
′
tSxut − y
′
tSyut
+
1
2
µ′ytΛt+1µyt + βEt
(
−
1
2
x′t+1Jt+1xt+1 −
1
2
vt+1
)
,
subject to (32) and
xt+1 = Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut + Cxεt+1,
where the Lagrange multiplier µyt is associated with (32). The above problem is a standard
linear quadratic control problem with state variable xt and control variables ut and yt. In
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Appendix C, we solve for Jt, vt and linear decision rules of the following form:
ut = −Ftxt, yt = Gtxt.
To find the time-invariant functions, we start with an initial guess of a positive semi-definite
matrix Jt+1, a constant vt+1, and any matrix Gt+1. We then obtain the updated constant vt
and matrices Jt and Gt. Iterating this process until convergence gives J and G in a Markov
perfect equilibrium. In addition, vt converges to v in the value function and Ft converges to
F , which gives the stationary policy rule. Note that since MPE is a fixed point, there may be
multiple equilibria or no equilibrium. For the simple New Keynesian model, Woodford (2010)
provides explicit characterizations. But a similar characterization for our general model is not
available. For the numerical examples in the next section, we find the solution is unique.
5. Applications to Monetary Policy
In this section, we apply our general theory to the study of robustly optimal monetary policy
in a New Keynesian model. The central bank’s loss function is given by
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[
pi2t + λ(xt − x
∗)2
]
, (34)
where pit denotes the inflation rate, xt denotes the output gap, and x
∗ ≥ 0 denotes the target
output gap. The value of x∗ measures the degree of inefficiency of the steady state. If x∗ = 0,
the steady state is efficient. The parameter λ measures the weight to the output gap.
Empirical studies find evidence that inflation is persistent (e.g., Fuhrer and Moore (1995)).
Thus, suppose that the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is given by
pit = κxt + ηpit−1 + β(1− η)Etmt+1pit+1 + zt, (35)
where η ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of backward-looking behavior exhibited by inflation.10
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Assume that κ > 0 and {zt} follows an AR(1) process:
zt = ρzzt−1 + σzεt, εt ∼ N (0, 1), (36)
where ρz ∈ (0, 1) and σz > 0. When η = 0, the model reduces to the basic New Keynesian
model studied by Woodford (2010). When η ∈ (0, 1), Woodford’s (2010) analytical method
does not apply because the lagged inflation rate provides another state variable.
5.1. Timeless Perspective Commitment
The robustly optimal policy problem with commitment is given by
max
{xt,pit}
min
{mt+1}
−E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[
pi2t + λ(xt − x
∗)2
]
+ θE−1
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1 (37)
subject to (35). To solve this problem using our general framework, we define a new predeter-
mined state variable as kt+1 ≡ pit and rewrite (35) as
kt+1 = pit, (38)
Etmt+1pit+1 = β
−1(1− η)−1 (−ηkt + pit − κxt − zt) . (39)
To map this problem into our general framework, we note that kt and zt constitute the pre-
determined vector xt, pit is the forward-looking variable yt, and xt is the control variable ut.
Assume that the central bank commits to a policy in the form
pit+1 = Φt + Γεt+1. (40)
Let µpit denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (39). As in Section 3, we can show that
the worst-case belief satisfies
Etmt+1pit+1 = Φt + θ
−1Γ2µpit. (41)
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Since Etpit+1 = Φt, θ
−1Γ2µpit represents the distortion of the private agents’ expectations rela-
tive to the central bank’s. We can then use our algorithm developed in Section 3 to solve for a
robustly optimal policy with timeless perspective commitment.
[Insert Figure 1 Here.]
We set baseline parameter values for β, κ, λ, and x∗ as in Woodford (2010): β = 0.99,
κ = 0.2, λ = 0.08, x∗ = 0.05.11 We first set η = 0 in the top four panels of Figure 1. In
particular, the first panel replicates the result in Woodford (2010) when ρz = 0. We confirm
his result that when the central bank is more concerned for robustness, it is more conservative
and inflation responds less to the cost-push shock in the sense that Γ decreases with 1/θ. In
addition, Γ decreases more than proportionally with σz. This implies that certainty-equivalence
does not apply to the robustly optimal case. Notably, Γ decreases with σz for large values of
σz when ρz is sufficiently large. When the cost-push shock is sufficiently persistent as much as
ρz = 0.95, robustly optimal Γ is almost independent of σz, as illustrated in the second panel
of Figure 1. The middle two panels of this figure shows the impact of ρz for σz = 0.02 and
0.04. Under rational expectations, Γ is an increasing function of ρz, which can be easily verified
analytically. When robustness matters, however, this relation does not apply. For low values
of σz, e.g., σz = 0.02, Γ first increases with ρz and then decreases to zero. If the concern for
robustness is very high, e.g., θ = 0.001, Γ decreases with ρz for high σz, e.g., σz = 0.04. In the
limiting case, Γ = 0 if the cost-push shock process is a unit root process (i.e., ρz = 1) for all
θ <∞.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase in
response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness. The central
bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the private agents’ inflation expectations
unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off might worsen if it allows
inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank’s concern for the unfavorable change in the
agent’s forecast becomes larger when the cost-push shock is more persistent. As a result, the
central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal inflation rate. If the shock is as highly
persistent as a unit root process, the central bank commits to an inflation rate which does not
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depend on the current shock.
The bottom two panels of Figure 1 show the impact of inflation persistence η. For simplicity,
we assume that the cost-push shock does not exhibit persistence, i.e., ρz = 0. In the rational
expectations case (i.e., θ = ∞), Γ increases with η until η = 0.5, then decreases. The shape
of Γ shows a symmetry around η = 0.5. As the degree of concern for robustness increases,
i.e., θ decreases, Γ also decreases for a fixed η. The degree of decrease in Γ is larger when η
is smaller. This is because the impact of the concern for robustness increases when the weight
on the inflation expectation is larger (i.e., η is smaller) in the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
In the limiting case when η = 1, inflation is completely determined one period ahead so that
the central bank’s doubt about the private sector’s expectations does not change the optimal
policy for inflation. Accordingly, the shape of Γ is no longer symmetric. Also note that for a
given value of η the optimal value of Γ decreases more as σz increases.
[Insert Figure 2 Here.]
Figure 2 presents the dynamics of inflation, the worst-case inflation expectation, output
gap, and prices in response to a purely temporary one-standard-deviation cost-push shock. For
a moderate degree of inflation inertia (η = 0.3), the impulse responses exhibit very similar
dynamics for both the rational expectations equilibrium and the robustly optimal equilibrium.
The intuition is that the impact of the belief distortion from the private sector is small since a
weight of 0.7 is attached to the expected inflation. We also find that the long-run inflation rate
is small but positive for both the rational expectations and robustness cases. The intuition is
that in the presence of inflation inertia, the change in current inflation does not move future
expected inflation one for one as it is attached a weight less than one. The central bank has an
incentive to increase inflation to raise the output gap given x∗ > 0. The robustly optimal long-
run output gap is still negative, which follows from the fact the long-run worst-case inflation
expectations of the private agents are positive, worsening the inflation-output tradeoff.
We emphasize that the impact of robustness also depends on the efficiency of the steady
state, as reflected by the value of x∗. This is because the Lagrange multiplier µpit associated
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with NKPC (35) increases with x∗ by the following first-order condition with respect to xt,
β−1(1− η)−1κµpit = −λ(xt − x
∗).
As revealed by Figure 2, this result has two consequences. First, x∗ biases the inflation expecta-
tion upward by (41). Thus, the steady-state output gap is negative even though the steady-state
inflation rate is zero. Second, E
[
µ2pit
]
also increases with x∗. As we have discussed in the end
of Section 3, this implies that Γ decreases with x∗ for a finite θ (see (25)). Thus, under ro-
bustly optimal monetary policy the central bank will be more conservative in raising inflation
in response to a positive cost-push shock when the economy is more inefficient. This result is
in sharp contrast to that in the rational expectations case. Under rational expectations, the
level of x∗ does not affect Γ.
5.2. Discretion
We define zt and kt = pit−1 as the state variables and use the algorithm described in Section 4
to solve for a linear MPE of the form:
pit = G0 +Gpipit−1 +Gzzt, (42)
where G0, Gpi, and Gz are constants to be determined. The coefficients Gpi and Gz measure
the sensitivities of inflation to pit−1 and zt , respectively. We can rewrite (42) as
pit = G0 +Gpipit−1 + ρzGzzt−1 + G¯εt,
where G¯ ≡ σzGz, which is the sensitivity of inflation to a shock εt and corresponds to Γ under
commitment.
[Insert Figure 3 Here.]
As we showed earlier, the inflation inertia in the New Keynesian Phillips curve reduces the
effect of inflation expectations and hence the effect of a concern for robustness on the optimal
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policy under commitment. This fact also applies to the discretionary policy with a concern for
robustness. Figure 3 shows the optimal responses of inflation (i.e., Γ and G¯) to a cost-push shock
under commitment and under discretion for different values of σz, respectively, and the effects
of η and ρz. For a purely temporary shock without inflation persistence (i.e., ρz = 0 and η = 0),
we confirm Woodford’s (2010) result that robustly optimal inflation under discretion is more
responsive to the cost-push shock than in the rational expectations case. When the cost-push
shock becomes more persistent, e.g., ρz is increased to 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation under
discretion is more responsive to the cost-push shock for a given value of σz. But the range of
σz for the existence of a robust MPE shrinks.
Turn to the impact of inflation persistence. For ρz = 0, when the degree of inflation inertia
is increased from η = 0 to η = 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is less
responsive to the cost-push shock for a given value of σz. In addition, the range of σz for the
existence of a robust MPE expands. Thus, the net effects of the shock persistence and inflation
persistence are ambiguous. Comparing the bottom two panels of Figure 3, we find that given
η = 0.5, when ρz is increased from 0 to 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation under discretion
becomes more responsive to the cost-push shock for small values of σz, but it is less responsive
for high values of σz.
[Insert Figure 4 Here.]
Figure 4 exhibits how a discretionary policy responds to lagged inflation for different values
of σz. When the central bank has a doubt about its knowledge of the inflation expectations
of the private sector, the optimal discretionary policy is more sensitive to lagged inflation than
under rational expectations. The sensitivity increases as the volatility σz of the cost-push shock
increases. This is in contrast to the case of rational expectations under which optimal inflation
responds to lagged inflation by the same degree regardless of the size of σz. Furthermore, as
the central bank is more concerned about robustness (i.e., θ is smaller), the sensitivity to the
lagged inflation of a discretionary policy becomes larger. But the range of σz for the existence
of a robust MPE is smaller.
Figure 4 also reveals that for fixed ρz, when inflation persistence is larger (e.g., η is increased
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from 0.3 to 0.5), the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is more responsive to lagged
inflation. For fixed η, when the cost-push shock is more persistent (e.g., ρz is increased from 0 to
0.5), the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is also more responsive to lagged inflation.
The intuition behind the above results is that, without commitment, the inflation bias is
larger in the case of concerns for robustness than in the case of rational expectations. Under the
worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations are biased upward, and hence a discretionary central
bank has a greater incentive to respond to both the current shock and lagged inflation than
under rational expectations. This effect is stronger if the cost-push shock is more persistent.
However, this effect is weaker if a smaller weight is put on the inflation expectations.
[Insert Figure 5 Here.]
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of inflation, the worst-case inflation expectation,
output gap, and prices to a positive cost-push shock under discretion. To compare with the
commitment solution, we also plot impulse responses under commitment. When the central
bank has a concern for robustness, the steady-state level of inflation under discretion is higher
than that under rational expectations. But the steady-state level of the output gap under
discretion is still below the one with commitment. With commitment, however, the steady-
state level of inflation is not affected by a concern for robustness. This is because under robust
MPE, the central bank needs to keep inflation rate higher since otherwise output would be
lowered even further due to the distorted belief of private agents. But the central bank cannot
allow too much inflation to increase output for fear of the possibility that inflation expectation
would become so high that the output gap might actually decline further.
We emphasize that with discretionary monetary policy under robustness, the inflation expec-
tation is distorted more than with commitment. With commitment, the central bank actively
manages the beliefs of private agents and reduces the distortion in private beliefs; hence the
output gap. By contrast, the central bank with discretionary monetary policy cannot manage
expectations of the private sector effectively, and thus both the inflation expectation and the
output gap worsen.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented algorithms for solving robust policy problems in a general
linear-quadratic framework by extending the Woodford (2010) approach. We have applied
our algorithms to a New Keynesian model. Our algorithms are based on a linear-quadratic
framework, which has been applied widely for policy analysis. One may wonder whether this
framework can be justified by a microfounded model. This question does not seem obvious with
concerns for robustness, though this issue is well understood under rational expectations (e.g.,
Woodford (2003)). Adam and Woodford (2012) present a fully microfounded model and show
that the linear-quadratic model of Woodford (2010) can be microfounded.
This paper only focuses on the Woodford approach to robust policy. As Hansen and Sargent
(2012) point out, there are other types of ambiguity for policy analysis. It would be interesting
to study these types of ambiguity in a general linear-quadratic framework. We leave this study
to Kwon and Miao (2017).
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Appendix
A State Space Representation of the Solution
We adapt Klein’s (2000) method to derive the solution in (23) and (24). His method cannot
be directly applied since the system in (22) does not fit in his general form. Apply a QZ
decomposition to matrices J and F. There exist square complex matrices Q, S, T and Z such
that
J = QSZH , F = QTZH ,
where ZH denotes the transpose of the complex conjugate of Z. Q and Z are unitary (i.e.,
QHQ = ZHZ = I), and S and T are upper triangular (see Golub and van Loan (1996)).
The decomposition can be reordered so that the block corresponding to the stable generalized
eigenvalues (the ith diagonal element of T divided by the corresponding element in S) comes
first. Define auxiliary variables
 kt
λt
 = ZH

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

, (A.1)
where kt corresponds to the predetermined variables εt, xt and Φt−1, and λt corresponds to the
non-predetermined variables ut, µyt, µxt, and Etµxt+1. Premultiplying (22) by Q
H , using (A.1),
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and partitioning S and T conformably, we can derive
 Skk Skλ
0 Sλλ
Et
 kt+1
λt+1
 =
 Tkk Tkλ
0 Tλλ

 kt
λt
 . (A.2)
We solve for a stable solution to the above system, which requires that the number of stable
generalized eigenvalues be equal to the number of predetermined variables. We rule out the
case of generalized eigenvalues with unitary modulus. Thus, the lower right block contains the
unstable generalized eigenvalues. It follows that λt = 0 for all t. We can then write remaining
equations in the above system as
Etkt+1 = S
−1
kk
Tkkkt, (A.3)
where Skk is invertible by our ordering of the matrix S.
Premultiplying both sides of (A.1) by Z yields:

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

= Z
 kt
λt
 =
 Zkk Zkλ
Zλk Zλλ

 kt
λt
 =
 Zkk
Zλk
 kt, (A.4)
where we have used the fact that λt = 0. Suppose that Zkk is invertible. It follows that
kt = Z
−1
kk

εt
xt
Φt−1
 . (A.5)
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Substituting the above equation into (A.3) yields:
Z−1kk Et

εt+1
xt+1
Φt
 = S−1kk TkkZ−1kk

εt
xt
Φt−1
 .
Premultiplying by Zkk and using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
Etεt+1
Etxt+1
Φt
 = ZkkS−1kk TkkZ−1kk

εt
xt
Φt−1
 .
Using equations (A.4) and (A.5) yields:

ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

= Zλkkt = ZλkZ
−1
kk

εt
xt
Φt−1
 .
Using (6), we then obtain the solution in the form of (23) and (24).
B Computing Unconditional Moments
After we derive the state space representation of the solution, we can compute unconditional
moments of interest. First, define an auxiliary variable Xt ≡
[
ε′t x
′
t Φ
′
t−1
]′
. Then it follows
from (23) that
E
[
Xt+1X
′
t+1
]
=ME
[
XtX
′
t
]
M ′ +

I C ′x 0
Cx CxC
′
x 0
0 0 0

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This is a Lyapunov equation which determines the unconditional second moments of predeter-
mined variables. This equation can be solved if predetermined variables are stationary processes,
i.e. all the eigenvalues of M are inside the unit circle, which is assumed to be true under a
timeless perspective.
Next, we use (24) to derive that
µyt = N21εt +N22xt +N23Φt−1 = N2Xt,
where N2 ≡
[
N21 N22 N23
]
is the second row of N. We can compute that
E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
= N2E
[
XtX
′
t
]
N ′2.
Finally, we use (24) to compute the unconditional moments:
E

ut+1ε
′
t+1
µyt+1ε
′
t+1
µxt+1ε
′
t+1
Et+1µxt+2ε
′
t+1

= NE

εt+1ε
′
t+1
xt+1ε
′
t+1
Φtε
′
t+1
 = N

I
Cx
0
 .
We then obtain the moments E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
, E
[
µxt+2ε
′
t+1
]
, E
[
µyt+1ε
′
t+1
]
, and E [utε
′
t] .
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C Computing Discretionary Policy
Substituting xt+1 = Axxxt+Axyyt+Bxut+Cxεt+1 into the value function for xt+1 in (33) and
deriving first-order conditions, we obtain
yt : 0 =−Qyyyt −Q
′
xyxt − Syut + (Ayy −Gt+1Axy)
′ µyt
− βA′xyJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) , (C.1)
ut : 0 =−Rut − S
′
xxt − S
′
yyt + (By −Gt+1Bx)
′ µyt
− βB′xJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) . (C.2)
Define the matrix Bˆt+1 ≡ (Ayy −Gt+1Axy)
′ and assume that it is invertible. Solving (C.1)
for µyt, we can obtain
µyt = At+1xt +Bt+1yt +Ct+1ut, (C.3)
where
At+1 ≡ Bˆ
−1
t+1
(
Q′xy + βA
′
xyJt+1Axx
)
,
Bt+1 ≡ Bˆ
−1
t+1
(
Qyy + βA
′
xyJt+1Axy
)
,
Ct+1 ≡ Bˆ
−1
t+1
(
Sy + βA
′
xyJt+1Bx
)
.
Substituting (C.3) into (C.2) and solving for ut will yield
ut = A
∗
t+1xt +B
∗
t+1yt, (C.4)
where
A∗t+1 ≡ −D
−1
t+1
[
S′x − (By −Gt+1Bx)
′At+1 + βB
′
xJt+1Axx
]
,
B∗t+1 ≡ −D
−1
t+1
[
S′y − (By −Gt+1Bx)
′Bt+1 + βB
′
xJt+1Axy
]
.
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Note that we have defined
Dt+1 ≡ R− (By −Gt+1Bx)
′Ct+1 + βB
′
xJt+1Bx,
and assumed that it is invertible.
Substituting (C.4) into (C.3), we obtain
µyt = At+1xt + Bt+1yt, (C.5)
where
At+1 ≡ At+1 +Ct+1A
∗
t+1,
Bt+1 ≡ Bt+1 +Ct+1B
∗
t+1
After plugging (C.4) and (C.5) into (32) and solving for yt, we can derive the policy rule
for period t as yt = Gtxt, where
Gt ≡ −∆
−1
t+1
[
Gt+1
(
Axx +BxA
∗
t+1
)
+ Λt+1At+1 −Ayx −ByA
∗
t+1
]
,
∆t+1 ≡ Gt+1
(
Axy +BxB
∗
t+1
)
+ Λt+1Bt+1 −Ayy −ByB
∗
t+1.
We also have to assume that ∆t+1 is invertible. Substituting yt = Gtxt into (C.4) yields:
ut = −Ftxt, (C.6)
where
Ft ≡ −A
∗
t+1 −B
∗
t+1Gt.
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Applying the envelop theorem to (33) yields:
−Jtxt = −Qxxxt −Qxyyt − Sxut + Aˆt+1µt − βA
′
xxJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) .
Substituting yt = Gtxt, (C.5), and (C.6) for yt, µyt and ut into the above equation, we can
show that
Jt = Qxx +QxyGt − SxFt − Aˆt+1 (At+1 + Bt+1Gt)
+βA′xxJt+1 (Axx +AxyGt −BxFt) .
Matching constant terms in (33) yields:
vt = β
(
tr
(
C ′xJt+1Cx
)
+ vt+1
)
.
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Notes
1There is a growing literature on the applications of robustness and ambiguity to finance and macroeconomics,
e.g., Epstein and Wang (1994); Hansen (2007); and Ju and Miao (2012); among others.
2See Hansen and Sargent (2012) for a discussion of different types of ambiguity.
3The singular case can be handled by the QZ decomposition method, e.g., Klein (2000) and Sims (2002).
4Kwon and Miao (2017) study this type of policy in models with three types of ambiguity.
5See Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) for the concept of self-consistency under rational expectations.
6For any scalar function f (X) of a n× k matrix X = (xij), we define the derivative
∂f (X)
∂X
=


∂f(X)
∂x11
...
∂f(X)
∂x1k
...
∂f(X)
∂xn1
...
∂f(X)
∂xnk


n×k
.
7In our solution, the non-predetermined variable yt in the equilibrium system from the private sector is
rewritten using predetermined variables (Φt−1, εt). Thus, the Lagrange multiplier µyt associated with yt becomes
a non-predetermined variable.
8Note that the system in (22) does not fit exactly in Klein’s (2000) general form.
9Note that taking unconditional expectations on other first-order conditions, i.e. (16)∼(18), does not add
additional information to the solution.
10See, e.g, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) for a microfounded model with this feature.
11There is a typo in Woodford (2010). Parameter values of κ and x∗ in his paper should be interchanged to
replicate the figures in his paper.
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Figure 1: Variation of Γ with σz, ρz, and η for alternative values of θ. For the top four panels,
we set η = 0. For the bottom two panels, we set ρz = 0.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a purely temporary positive cost-push shock with η = 0.3 and
σz = 0.02. The inflation expectation is with respect to the worst-case beliefs of the private
agents.
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Figure 3: Variation of G¯ and Γ with σz for different values of ρz and η, under discretionary
policy and under an optimal commitment, with and without a concern for robustness (θ = ∞
and θ = 0.001).
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Figure 4: Variation of sensitivity of inflation to lagged inflation (Gpi) with σz
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a purely temporary positive cost-push shock with η = 0.3 and
σz = 0.02 under commitment and discretion. With concern for robustness, θ = 0.001.
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